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Abstract: This paper explores the effect of the possibility of third-party intervention on behavior
in a variant of the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) “Investment Game”.  A third-party’s
material payoff is not affected by the decisions made by the other participants, but this person
may choose to punish a responder who has been overly selfish.  The concern over this possibility
may serve to discipline potentially-selfish responders.  We also explore a treatment in which the
third party may also choose to reward a sender who has received a low net payoff as a result of
the responder’s action.  We find a strong and significant effect of third-party punishment, in both
punishment regimes, as the amount sent by the first mover is more than 60% higher when there
is the possibility of third-party punishment.   We also find that responders return a higher
proportion of the amount sent to them when there is the possibility of punishment, with this
proportion slightly higher when reward is not feasible.  Finally, third parties punish less when
reward is feasible, but nevertheless spend more on the combination of reward and punishment
when these are both permitted than on punishment when this is the only choice for redressing
material outcomes.
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1.  Introduction
One must often take a risk in economic environments in order to secure possible gains.
Purchasers order goods and presume that the quality when delivered will be suitable; principals
hire agents and may not be able to effectively regulate the agent’s behavior.  The importance of
trust among individuals has been the topic of considerable discussion in the recent literature.
Arrow (1974) pointed out that trust must be required in much economic activity in order to have
mutual gains in exchanges.  La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that
trust has a positive effect on the government effectiveness and also find that trust is associated
with lower inflation and with higher per capita GNP growth.  Other authors such as Coleman
(1990), Fukuyama (1995) or Gambetta (1998) find that trust has a high effect on the functioning
of the institutions of a society.
1
Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) introduce the Investment Game, in which a first
mover can pass some or all of his or her endowment to a responder, who receives three times the
amount sent by the first mover.  The responder then selects an amount to pass back to the first
mover.  The behavior of the first mover and the responder can be seen as proxies for ‘trusting’
and ‘trustworthy’ behavior, respectively.
2  This game has been used by many authors in the
literature trying to obtain the level of trust in the populations analyzed.
3  In general, the amount
                                                   
1 Others authors point out the importance of trust in e-commerce.  Hoffman, Novak and Peralta (1999) show that
almost 95% of consumers have declined to provide personal information to web sites and 63% of them argued that
they did not trust those collecting the data.  They also show that consumers do not trust Web providers to engage in
exchanges, involving money, with them.   Mutz (2005) examines the impact of social trust on participation in e-
commerce.
2 These proxies are imperfect, as people may have other motivations for their choices.  For example, a first mover
may have a desire to increase the total payoff of the group (see Charness and Rabin 2002); similarly, a responder
may dislike inequality (rather than being concerned with being trustworthy per se) and so may return some to the
first mover for this reason.  Nevertheless, in this paper we consider a first mover who sends a positive amount to be
trusting and a responder who returns at least as much as what was sent to be trustworthy.
3 See for example Barr (2003), Cox (2004) or Gneezy, Güth and Verboven (2000), among others.2
passed by the first mover is less than optimal, so that finding a method to increase the level of
trust of the population could open new possibilities of improving economic transactions and
would corresponding benefits to society.
The question is then, how can we increase trust experimentally?  Berg et al. (1995) find
that subjects behave differently in a one-shot game if they know the results of earlier games;
these results indicate that expectations have an effect on behavior.   Barr (2003) shows that
trusting behavior is motivated by expectation of trustworthiness.   Her analysis shows that
altruistic motivations and the desire of “community-build” also appear as possible explanations
of trusting behavior.  Cox (2002), comparing results in an investment game and in a dictator
game, gives evidence that there is significant expectation of trustworthiness in the investment
game.
This paper considers a simple modification of the Investment Game, in which a third-
party, whose material payoff is unaffected by choices by the first mover and the responder, can
choose to sacrifice some of his or her material payoff to punish a responder who presumably
returns an insufficient amount to the first mover.  The aim of our study is to explore whether
introducing the presence of a third-party punisher who will assess other players’ performance
increases  trusting  behavior  of  individuals,  based  on  the  above  idea  that  expectations  of
trustworthiness play an important role in trust.
The punishment performed by uninvolved third parties is not trivial or incidental.  Why
do people punish others’ behavior at a cost for themselves?   The economics literature has
developed some explanations for this kind of behavior.   Levine’s (1998) model rests on the
assumption that there is a willingness to punish individuals with spiteful preferences.  Fehr and
Fischbacher (2004) show that third-party sanctions are driven by negative emotions and negative
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fairness judgments towards norms violators.  Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr (2003) and Fehr,
Fischbacher and Gächter (2002) give empirical evidence of what they call “strong reciprocity”,
the predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of
cooperation at a personal cost.  There are also other possible explanations for this behavior, such
as fairness or equality (see Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Charness and Rabin 2002 or Rabin 1993).
To the best of our knowledge, no paper has analyzed the effect of third-party punishment
on trusting behavior.  We introduce two variants, one in which the third party can only choose
whether or not to punish the responder or not, and one in which the third party can choose to
either punish the responder, reward the first mover, or do neither (or both).   Reward in this
framework has been previously considered only in relation to second-party punishment (players
who make the punishment decision are involved in the game).
4
Our results in both variants show that the existence of a person who can observe and
punish the violation of the distribution norm (see Fehr and Fischbacher 2004) significantly and
substantially increases the amount of money sent by first movers in our population.
5
We find little difference in the amount sent by first movers when reward is feasible
(compared to when only punishment is feasible).  Responders return a significant higher amount
when third parties can intervene than in the control treatment.   The amount sent back is
somewhat lower when reward is feasible; perhaps this stems from responders perceiving that
some third parties might wish to increase the total social payoffs and thus reward impoverished
                                                   
4 See for instance  Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2002),  Fehr &  Gächter (2003), Sutter,  Haigner and  Kocher (2006),
Eckel & Grossman (1996), and Ottone (2005).
5 The Fehr and  Fischbacher (2004) study has some similarities to ours, but the game analyzed is different and they
did not use reward to enhance cooperation.  In one of their treatments they run a Prisoner’s dilemma with third-party
punishment in two stages.   In the first stage, players A and B, who were endowed with 10 points, had only two
choices: keep or transfer all points. In the second stage, an external observer endowed with 40 points has the
opportunity to punish A and/or B with a ratio of 3 to 1. They focus their analysis in punishers’ behavior and found
that almost half of C players punished the defector when the other player has cooperated.4
first movers rather than punish misbehaving responders.  There is also evidence that the level of
punishment, in general, increases with increasing difference between first-mover and responder
profits.  Finally, results show that, although the third party sacrifices more in total when both
reward and punishment are feasible, the level of punishment is higher when only punishment can
be chosen.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes some of
the relevant literature and presents our hypotheses.  We present the experimental design and
procedures in section 3.  The main results are reported and we offer some discussion in section 4.
We conclude in section 5.
2.  Previous literature & hypotheses
The Berg et al. (1995) Investment Game features two types of players, A and B.  Both A
and B receive an endowment of $10.  In the first stage, A can pass some, all, or none of his or her
endowment to the paired B.  Each dollar sent to Player B is tripled.  In the second stage, after
observing the amount transferred by A, B decides how many dollars to send back to A, keeping
the remainder.  The amount B sends back to A is not tripled.  If we presume selfish preferences,
the subgame-perfect equilibrium prediction for this game is for A to send nothing and for B to
return nothing.   It is clear that this outcome is not Pareto-efficient, and that the only Pareto
efficient allocations occur if and only if A passes his or her entire endowment to B.
Berg et al. (1995) found that on average A players sent $5.16 and B players returned
$4.66.  Thus, on average, A’s lose money by sending positive amounts.  While B’s who receive
more do tend to pass more, the proportion returned by B’s is uncorrelated with the amount B’s
receive in their No History treatment; however, there is a positive correlation when Social5
History has been provided to the participants, who then have more well-developed expectations
about behavior.
6  Expectations clearly matter; since the presence of a third-party punisher can
affect these expectations, it seems reasonable to expect this presence to affect behavior.
The Investment Game has been extensively analyzed in the experimental literature in a
search for the motivations behind trust.
7  However, the possibility of third-party punishment in
this game has not yet been studied.   Although many papers have investigated second-party
punishment in experimental games,
8 only a few papers analyze third-party sanctions in response
to unfair behavior, supporting the idea that those kinds of players do punish in a wide variety of
games and contexts, despite the fact that third-party punishers must sacrifice their endowment to
penalize an action in which they are not involved.  Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) study third-party
sanctions in a Dictator Game and in a Prisoners’ Dilemma.  They find that, in the Dictator Game,
most third parties punished dictators who transferred less than half of the pie.  In the Prisoners’
Dilemma, results show that 46% of third parties punish defectors if their partners cooperated.
Based on results obtained by Fehr and Gächter (2000) or Fehr and Gächter (2002),
9 we
test the following hypotheses concerning the effect of introducing a third-party punisher in the
BDM investment game:
H1: Introducing a third party who can intervene will lead to A’s sending more to B’s.
H2: B’s will return more to A’s if there is a third party who can intervene.
                                                   
6 The Spearman correlation coefficient is  rs = 0.01 in the No History treatment, compared to  rs = 0.34 in the Social
History treatment.
7 See for instance Croson & Buchan (1999), Cox (2002), Cox (2004), Gneezy et al. (2000).
8 See, for example,  Camerer (2003),  Güth,  Schmittberger and  Schwarze (1982),  Fehr,  Gächter and  Kirchsteiger
(1997) or Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992) among others.
9 They find that the threat of punishment has an effect on contributions in public-goods games.6
For establishing H1, we presume that one of the main considerations people have about
sending money in the Investment Game is that they would like to receive back at least the same
amount that they have sent, being no worse off.  Cox (2002) and Barr (2003) provide results
supporting this assumption.  The idea behind third-party intervention is that uninvolved players
can punish unfair behavior or perhaps also help victims of violations to this ‘norm’.
Reward has been principally analyzed in combination with second-party punishment.
Sefton et al. (2002) compare second-party reward to cooperators versus punishment to defectors
in a public goods game and found that reward is less efficient, especially in relation with the
decay in time.
10  Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003) analyze an ultimatum game with an
additional stage where the responder can reward or punish the proposer (with some cost). They
run four treatments: the baseline, only punishment, only reward, and both punishment and
reward.  They find that reward and punishment are complements, so the last treatment is the most
efficient for enhancing cooperation.   Charness and Levine (forthcoming) incorporate both
second-party punishment and reward in a design where the final “wage” received by the
responder is in part stochastic; even at the same net wage, the responder chooses reward
(punishment) more frequently when the first mover has chosen a high (low) wage.
Third-party punishment and reward are combined in Ottone (2005), who proposes a
Dictator Game with a second stage where an external observer could punish dictators and/or
reward recipients.  She shows that the level of punishment is proportional to unfair offers of
dictators.  But the interaction between the first and second parties is not a strategic environment
and there are no efficiency considerations in the Dictator Game.
                                                   
10  Fehr &  Gächter (2003) also found similar results in a public goods game. Sutter et al. (2006) introduce
endogenous choice of the reward or sanction system in a public goods game and they show that cooperation is
higher when subjects can choose the system than when it is exogenously imposed.7
In order to compare reward and punishment to punishment only, we also run a treatment
in which an unrelated player, after observing A’s and B’s behavior, has the opportunity to reward
player A and/or punish player B.  Thus, we also test the following hypotheses:
H3: First movers will transfer more when both reward and punishment are feasible than when
only punishment is feasible.
H4: Responders will return less when both reward and punishment are feasible than when only
punishment is feasible.
To motivate H3, we consider that a first mover may feel safer in transferring a larger
amount when there is the additional possibility that the third party can remedy a shortfall from
the responder.  Regarding H4, a responder may perceive less of a threat, as a third party who
cares about efficiency may choose to help the first mover, rather than to punish the responder.
11
A final operational note is that we decided to have the participants themselves vote for
the third parties, rather than choosing them at random.  Here the idea was to increase the sense of
responsibility for the third parties.  The intuition behind this is that when third parties know that
they have been selected as punishers by the rest of participants in the experiment, they will feel
more involved in their task.  First, we asked subjects to all stand and show their ‘identification
numbers’.  They then voted for one of these identification numbers.  No other information was
provided to the subjects before the voting process, as additional personal information could have
affected the perceived social distance, which has been shown to have an important effect.
12
                                                   
11 The notion of  responsibility alleviation  ( Charness 2000) suggests that responders will make more pro-social
choices (return more) when they are fully responsible for the first mover’s payoff (in the punishment only case).
12 See for instance Bohnet & Frey (1999), Charness & Gneezy (forthcoming).8
3.  Experimental design
We conducted six sessions at UCSB, two for each of the three different treatments, with
16-24 participants per session.  Subjects were recruited from a university-wide e-mail database
of interested students.  All sessions were run in a large classroom divided into two sides and in
each row four people sat sufficiently separated.  No one was allowed to participate in more than
one session.  On average, each person received about $13 for a one-hour session.
The first treatment was the standard Investment Game where both players A and B
received an endowment of 10 points. The other two treatments featured potential third-party
punishment.  At the beginning of the second and third treatments, participants were handed out a
label with a number printed in it.   After explaining the game in detail, people voted for the third
parties; those people receiving the most votes became the third parties, with ties broken
randomly. The elected third parties then were asked move to the back of the room, maintaining
separation among them.
In all treatments, the roles for A and B were randomly assigned with labels drawn from
an opaque bag (in the second and third treatments these labels were distributed for the remaining
participants after the voting for third parties).  Each label had a letter (A, B or C) and a number.
Once the roles were determined, A’s and B’s were seated on opposite sides of the room, with
separation between all individuals for privacy.
In treatments 2 and 3, A’s and B’s were endowed with 10 points, while C’s were
endowed with 40 points.
13   The conversion rate for points to dollars was 2:1 for A’s and B’s and
3:1 for C’s; each participant knew that the conversion rate for C’s could be different than that for
                                                   
13 We decided to endow C with a sufficiently large amount of points to avoid C comparing his or her points with B
amount. Thus, in the most favorable case for B, when A transfers 10 points, C will not punish B in order to decrease
the difference in payoffs between B and C (see Fehr & Fischbacher 2004).9
A’s and B’s, but were only told their own conversion rate.   C’s could choose to punish (or
reward, in treatment 3); each point sacrificed by C decreased B’s payoff by three points or (with
reward) increased A’s payoff by three points, and this was common information.
There were three rounds in each session, with no feedback given.  Subjects retained their
role in all rounds, but they were matched with different partners in each one.
14  Participants were
told at the outset that they would be paid for only one of the three rounds, chosen randomly at the
end of the session by rolling a die.  The experiment was structured in the following way.  First,
decision sheets were passed out to all participants.  A’s decision sheets had the label they had
drawn written in the top left corner of each decision sheet.  A’s passed their decision sheets face
down toward the center aisle and these were then collected.  We then wrote the label for the
corresponding B in the top right corner of A’s decision sheet, and cut off the corner where the A
player’s label was written.  These decision sheets were distributed to the corresponding B’s.
Each B observed what A has chosen and then made a decision on a separate decision
sheet with B’s label in the top right corner; this was passed face down to the center aisle and
collected, along with A’s decision sheet.  We then wrote the identification of the corresponding
C in the top left corner of both decision sheets and cut off the top right corner of the decision.
Next, we distributed both sheets to C, who observed A’s and B’s decisions and made choices
about punishment (and reward, in treatment 3).  These were collected face down and placed in a
folder.  In this manner, our procedural design comes close to a “double-blind” protocol.  This
process was repeated in each of the three rounds.  When a round was selected for payment at the
end of the session, we opened the corresponding folder and calculated actual payoffs.
                                                   
14 This was common information among subjects.10
4.  Results
In this section, we first present the results for A’s, then the responses by B’s, and then the
choices made by C’s.   In the process, we also discuss how the data either support or reject our
hypotheses.  As a summary, we can say that the presence of a third party has a strong effect on
both the amounts sent by A’s and the amounts returned by B’s.  C’s are more prone to sacrifice
points when there is more inequity between the corresponding A and B payoffs at the time of C’s
decision, and C sacrifices slightly more when both punishment and reward are feasible.
In treatments 1, 2, and 3, we had 16, 14 and 12 groups of subjects respectively.  As we
run three rounds for each experiment, we have tested if the three different rounds for A, B and C
players could be pooled in a single sample (of 48, 42 and 36 observations respectively). We have
used a single-factor within-subjects analysis of variance test that is appropriate for two or more
dependent populations.   On this basis, we pool results across rounds, as we do not find
substantial differences over time.
15
Amounts sent by A’s
Table I shows the average amount of points sent by player A in each treatment.
Table 1: A’s choices, by treatment
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Mean transfer 3.73 6.02 6.14
Observations 48 42 36
                                                   
15 Pooling across rounds seems particularly innocuous for A’s, as they have received no feedback at all at the time of
their decisions in rounds 2 and 3.11
We see that A’s transfers are more than 60% higher when there is the possibility of third-
party punishment, and that there is very little difference in A’s behavior depending on whether
the third party can also choose to reward A.
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Visually, we see that these results are driven by the fact that low transfers are much more
frequent without third-party punishment, and high transfers are considerably more common
when third-party punishment is permitted.
A conservative Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney ranksum test using each individual’s average
transfer as one observation confirms that the difference between treatment 1 and treatment 2 is
statistically  significant  (Z = 1.98, p = 0.024, one-tailed test), as is the difference between
treatment 1 and treatment 3 (Z = 2.05, p = 0.020, one-tailed test).  A regression with standard
errors clustered on the individual confirms the statistical significance (Z = 1.96 and Z = 1.97,
respectively).  The observed behavior therefore confirms H1, that A’s transfer more when there12
is the possibility of third-party punishment.  This is the main result of the paper.  On the other
hand, the lack of difference between A’s transfers in treatments 2 and 3 (the Wilcoxon ranksum
test gives Z = 0.13, n.s.) goes against H3, the hypothesis that A’s will transfer more when reward
is feasible.
Amounts sent by B’s
The effect of potential third-party intervention on responder behavior could be analyzed
from several alternative points of view.  For instance, while it might seem obvious to simply
consider the absolute amounts transferred from B to A, one concern is that we are comparing
treatments where, in one of them, the amount sent by A is much lower than in the others.  One
might therefore expect B’s transfers to be higher in treatments 2 and 3, even if B’s had no
concern with possibly being sanctioned.  Another possibility may be to analyze B’s behavior in
terms of the proportion of the original A transfer.  Yet this approach also has problems – when
A’s transfers are low, then it is inexpensive for B to return a high percentage of the points
transferred by A.  However, if A’s transfers are high, then B must give up a larger sum of money
to achieve this same proportion.
As with nearly all studies investigating behavior in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game
such as ours, there is a strong positive relationship between the amount sent by the first mover
and the responder’s choice; in all treatments, the correlation between A’s transfer and B’s
transfer is positive and highly significant.
Table 2 shows the mean transfer by B’s in each treatment, as well as the average ratio of
B’s transfer to the amount sent by A.
16
                                                   
16 Simply calculating the aggregate ratio in each treatment will give excessive weight to observations where a higher
amount was passed by A.  We drop the observations where A transferred 0, as the ratio is undefined in that case.13
Table 2: B’s choices, by treatment
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Mean transfer 4.65 8.33 6.99
Mean ratio to A’s transfer 1.11 1.40 1.30
Observations 48 42 36
We see that while B’s transfer substantially more to A’s in treatments 2 and 3, the
difference in the average ratio is only a modest one.  Nevertheless, the relationship between these
average ratios is an intuitive one: Introducing a third party increases B’s responsiveness to A’s
transfer in both treatments 2 and 3, but this increase is smaller in treatment 3 when the third party
can choose to reward A as well as to punish B.
For the reasons explained above, we might analyze B’s transfers as a variable conditioned
on the amount sent by A.  Thus, we consider the General Lineal Model:
( ) i i bx a x X Y E + = = ,
where  i x X Y =  is the amount B returns to A conditioned to the fact that A has transferred  i x
points to B.  Once we run the linear regression, we then compute the predicted values of the
dependent variable,  ( ) i x X Y E = ˆ .  Finally, we analyze, using statistical tests, whether the means
of predicted values for B’s transfers differ across treatments.
If we compare the mean transfers for each individual in treatment 1 with those in
treatment 2 or 3, a Wilcoxon ranksum test confirms that B’s transfer is higher when there is a
third party than when there is not (Z = 3.726, p = 0.000, T1 vs. T2 and Z = 2.860, p = 0.002, T1
vs. T3, one-tailed tests).  Therefore, we find support for H2.
We find some modest support for H4.  Although the average A transfer is a bit higher
when only punishment is feasible, Table 2 indicates that the average transfer in treatment 2 is
higher than in treatment 3.  A Wilcoxon ranksum test (on the predicted values for B’s transfer)14
finds a marginally-significant difference in the levels of B’s transfer across treatments 2 and 3 (Z
= 1,339, p = 0.090, one-tailed test).  This result is compatible with B’s responsibility alleviation,
given that in treatment 3 A’s profit not only depends on B’s transfer but also on C’s reward.
Amounts sacrificed by C’s
While the behavior of the elected third parties is not the main focus of our study, we
nevertheless briefly present these results.  Table 3 shows the average amount of money spent by
third parties in treatments 2 and 3.
Table 3: Average third-party choices, by treatment
Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Amount spent to punish 1.45 1.03
Amount spent to reward - 0.86
Total amount spent 1.45 1.89
Observations 42 36
We observe 41% more points spent on punishment when this is the only tool available.
On the other hand, the total expenditure on intervention is 30% higher when both reward and
punishment are feasible. Notwithstanding reward is the most efficient action in treatment 3, C
prefers to sacrifice 20% more points to punish than to reward.   These results seem fairly
intuitive.  Since the third parties tend to intervene only when B misbehaves, we have relatively
few ‘useful’ observations.
17  Thus, statistical tests have little power here and neither rank-sum
tests nor regressions find either difference to be significant.
Nevertheless,  there  is  a  clear  relationship  between  third-party  behavior  and  the
combination of A and B choices, as shown in Figure 2 below (the two ranges were chosen to
give roughly equal numbers of observations):
                                                   
17 There are many cases where B returns a considerable proportion of what B receives from A, so that C does not
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There is little sacrifice by C’s when the difference between B’s payoff and A’s payoff is
relatively small, but a sizable amount of punishment when this difference is larger.  The amount
of reward is a bit larger than the amount of punishment when the difference in payoffs is larger.
It is clear that C’s are not acting in a random fashion.
























N 78 36 78
R
2 .112 .425 .291
Standard errors are clustered by individual and are in parentheses.
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at p = 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively16
Table 4 confirms the visual results in Figure 2, as the difference between B’s payoff and
A’s payoff is highly significant and appears to drive third-party intervention; when this disparity
is too large, some third parties sacrifice payoffs.
18  As mentioned above, we find no treatment
effect.  On average, an increase of 8.5 points in this difference leads to an increase of one unit in
total intervention.
5.  Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether the possibility of intervention by an external third
party can affect the behavior of individuals in a form of the Berg et al. (1995) Investment Game.
In particular, we are interested in whether the amount passed by the first mover, which is the
source of social gains in this game, is increased when a third party can make a sacrifice to bring
payoffs closer to balance.  We consider one variation in which punishment is the only feasible
intervention and another variation in which both reward and punishment are possible.
We find that first movers are willing to ‘trust’ more when a third party is present,
presumably through the belief that the responder is less likely to be selfish.  The amount passed
increases by over 60% over the no-punishment baseline in both treatments with feasible third-
party intervention.
Regarding the amount returned by responders, we find that third party intervention also
affects positively this amount.   Nevertheless, the amount sent back is higher when only
                                                   
18 Note that it is unnecessary to run a regression in which A’s payoff is an independent variable, given that the
difference of payoffs between A’s and B’s is very high if and only if A’s send many points and B’s return a very low
amount. Thus, in this setting we cannot distinguish whether C’s care about inequality among A’s and B’s payoff or
if they care about unfair B’s behavior.17
punishment is feasible than when both reward and punish are possible.  The threat of punishment
might be perceived weaker by responders when reward is also a possible action.
The third parties are in fact willing to spend some of their payoff to redress payoff
disparities, as the amount spent is strongly correlated with the amount by which the responder’s
payoff exceeds the first-mover’s payoff.   There is more punishment when this is the only
available sacrifice, but the total sacrifice is greater when reward is also an option. While
responders return more in the treatments with a third party, this amount is lower when reward is
also feasible. As we have controlled for the effect of the amount received by responders, we may
rule out the idea that this higher return is due to the fact that first movers have passed more in the
first place.
Our study demonstrates the relevance of external third parties in a sequential game.  It
seems that some people in the experimental population expect that an outsider will be willing to
incur some personal cost to punish the greedy or to help trusting victims.  In our environment,
the result is more trusting behavior.  To the extent that the laboratory is indicative of behavior in
the field,
19 perhaps there is scope for policy mechanisms such as third-party intervention to
improve trust more generally.
                                                   
19 Since emotion in the field tends to run higher than emotion in the laboratory, one might even consider laboratory
punishment understates punishment in the field.18
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